This paper focuses on the following U.S.-Japanese differences in work organizations and labor market practices: in Japanese firms, (i) real decision-making authority is delegated more to lower hierarchical levels, (ii) employees are multiple-skilled, (iii) human capital accumulation is more firm-specific, (iv) labor turnover rate is lower, and (v) continuous process improvement is more prevalent. I present a model that addresses interconnections among three key features of work organizations (multiskilling, delegation, and continuous process improvement), and analyses ways in which they are related to labor market practices. It analyses strategic interactions among firms concerning their choices of the nature of work organizations, and shows that strategic complementarity due to labor market externality can yield the multiplicity of equilibria, which provides a systematic explanation for the U.S.-Japanese differences.
INTRODUCTION
Nature of work organizations and labor market practices differ between the United States and Japan in a variety of ways. This paper focuses on the following differences. First, real decisionmaking authority is delegated more to lower hierarchical levels in Japanese firms than in U.S.
firms. Aoki (1986 Aoki ( , 1988 argues that typical Japanese firms employ horizontal information structure, in which workers have substantial decision-making power and determine how to cope with irregular events and exceptional operations through horizontal information exchange and coordination. Whereas typical U.S. firms employ vertical information structure, in which such decision is made at higher hierarchical levels. Second, Japanese firms tend to provide their employees with multiple skills for different jobs through on-the-job training and rotation, whereas such multiskilling practice is less common in U.S. firms. Third, human capital accumulation in Japanese firms is more firm-specific than in U.S. firms. Fourth, Japanese firms conduct continuous process improvement more than U.S. firms do. In particular, workers in Japanese firms are strongly encouraged to improve their work methods through actively participating in quality control (QC) circle activities.
1 Finally, the labor turnover rate is higher in the United States than in Japan. Hashimoto and Raisian (1985) showed that fifteen-year job retention rates were much higher in Japan than in the United States across all age groups. 2 Several authors previously pointed out interconnections among some of these differences. Aoki (1986) analysed trade-offs between the two information structures, where delegated workers make quicker but sub-optimal decisions under horizontal information structure. He argued that horizontal information structure tends to be more efficient than vertical information 1 Quality control circles in firms are small groups of workers meeting routinely to discuss ways to improve the efficiency and quality of their work performances (see, e.g., Hart and Kawasaki, 1999) . 2 See Section 2 for details on empirical evidences and case studies corresponding to the five differences described in this paragraph. structure if workers have broad knowledge on the whole work process of the firm through multiskilling, because such broad knowledge enables workers to make better decisions concerning how to cope with irregular and emergent events. Koike (1988) pointed out that the provision of multiple skills through rotation is indispensable for inducing workers to improve their work methods through quality control (QC) circles activities, because such improvement requires that workers have a good understanding of the entire production process.
This paper provides a theoretical explanation for the five U.S.-Japanese differences based on the multiplicity of equilibria. It presents a model that incorporates the previous insights described above, and analyses ways in which several key features of work organizations are related to labor market practices. In my model, the difference in labor turnover rate endogenously arises due to labor market externality and provides a systematic explanation for the U.S.-Japanese differences. The explanation can be viewed as a formalization of the conjecture by Aoki (1986) , who suggested that the different nature of labor mobility between the United States and Japan, interfirm mobility and intrafirm mobility (i.e. rotation) respectively, could be closely related to the difference in information structure of the firms between the two countries.
The logic of my argument goes as follows. A firm can provide its early-career employees with multiple skills for different jobs by incurring extra costs for their human capital accumulation. The employees then obtain a good understanding of the firm's entire work process through acquiring multiple skills. This enables the firm to conduct continuous process improvement by inducing its employees to actively participate in quality control (QC) circles activities. The firm can also take advantage of its employees' multiple skills by employing horizontal information structure in which real decision-making authority is delegated to lower hierarchical levels, because employees with multiple skills can cope with irregular and emergent events quickly and effectively.
Continuous process improvement involves a number of small changes and modifications, which are mostly unobservable from outside the firm. 3 Therefore, if a firm conducts continuous process improvement, a degree of specificity is introduced into the firm's technology. 4 An improved technology yields higher productivity only if it is operated by an employee who has been trained in the technology and so is familiar with its firm-specificity. Hence, the more employees remain in the firm, the higher the benefit of continuous process improvement. When other firms also conduct continuous process improvement, the firm's turnover rate becomes lower (and so its retention rate becomes higher) because its employees are less productive in other firms. Hence, the benefit of continuous process improvement increases when other firms also conduct continuous process improvement. On the other hand, the cost for providing its employees with multiple skills, the prerequisite for continuous process improvement, is not affected by other firms' behavior. If the net benefit is positive only if other firms also conduct continuous process improvement, two equilibria can exist; all firms conduct continuous process improvement in one equilibrium, whereas no firms conduct it in the other equilibrium. The former is interpreted as the Japanese equilibrium, and the latter the U.S. equilibrium.
In the Japanese equilibrium, each firm provides its employees with multiple skills, which enables continuous process improvement. Also, each firm employs horizontal information structure, because it is more efficient than vertical information structure if employees have multiple skills. Since continuous process improvement leads to a degree of specificity in a firm's technology, skills acquired by its employees become less effective in other firms. This lowers the turnover rate in the Japanese equilibrium, which, in turn, implies that Japanese firms' extra human capital investments in multiple skills pay off later. In contrast, no firms provide their employees with multiple skills in the U.S. equilibrium. This induces each firm to employ vertical information structure and adopt the general technology without conducting continuous process improvement. Employees accumulate general human capital under the general technology, and this raises the turnover rate in the U.S. equilibrium. Concerning equilibrium selection, historical events can provide an explanation for why different equilibria have been selected in the United
States and Japan. I will discuss this point in detail in Section 4.
This paper is related to Morita (2001) , which focused on U.S.-Japanese differences concerning continuous process improvement, turnover rate, and the level and firm-specificity of human capital accumulation. The paper showed that connection between continuous process improvement and the firm-specificity of training causes multiplicity of equilibria, and explored its labor market consequences. One equilibrium is interpreted as the Japanese equilibrium, in which all firms conduct continuous process improvement, and as a consequence training provided by such a firm becomes less effective in other firms. This lowers the turnover rate, which, in turn, increases firms' incentives to train employees. In the other equilibrium (interpreted as the U.S. equilibrium), training is general, which raises the turnover rate and decreases incentives to train.
Several other authors have also presented theoretical analyses related to the present paper. Carmichael and MacLeod (1993) considered a model in which workers have good ideas for technological progress. They showed that employees could induce workers to actively participate in technological progress by providing them with multiple skills. By multiskilling, employers can credibly commit to retain workers after technological progress is completed, because it is the employers' own interests ex post to transfer these workers to other jobs. Under principal-multi agents frameworks, Itoh (1991 Itoh ( , 1992 Itoh ( , 1994 and Owan (2001) analyzed agents' incentive issues, which are not addressed in the present paper. Itoh identified, in a variety of settings, conditions in which a principal prefers broad task assignments to specialized task assignments. Itoh (1994) showed that broad task assignment can be desirable from the incentive viewpoint even without technological complementarity among tasks. Owan (2001) showed that a principal can benefit from delegating a substantial level of decision-making authority to agents and assigning multiple and overlapping tasks to them, because this induces agents to acquire higher levels of human capital in order to enhance their bargaining power for their ex post wage negotiations.
Concerning explanations for cross country differences based on multiple equilibria, several authors recently proposed models that provide explanations for the lower turnover rate and higher human capital accumulation in Japan (or Germany) than in the United States (see, for example, Prendergast, 1989; Chang and Wang, 1995; Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998) . These are adverse selection models, where informational asymmetry on workers' abilities plays a central role in explaining the differences.
The present paper is complementary to these earlier papers. The main contribution of the present paper is that it addresses interconnections among three key features of work organizations (multiskilling, delegation, and continuous process improvement), and analyses ways in which they are related to labor market practices. It analyses strategic interactions among firms concerning their choices of the nature of work organizations, and shows that strategic complementarity due to labor market externality can yield the multiplicity of equilibria, which provides a systematic explanation for the U.S.-Japanese differences in work organizations and labor market practices. Furthermore, the explanation is consistent with historical events during the Second World War, where government labor regulations for enhancing labor productivity during the war were substantially different between the United States and Japan in many aspects.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents empirical evidence and case studies concerning the five U.S.-Japanese differences which this paper focuses on. Section 3 presents a two-period model, where firms simultaneously make decisions concerning the nature of their work organizations in period 1 and employees accumulate human capital. Employees can switch their employers between period 1 and 2. Section 4 first derives the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria of the model, and shows that the result provides an explanation for the five U.S.-Japanese differences in work organizations and labor market practices. Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
EVIDENCE
In this section, I present empirical evidence and case studies concerning the five U.S.-Japanese differences this paper focuses on. First, real decision-making authority is delegated more to lower hierarchical levels in Japanese firms than in U.S. firms. Lincoln et al. (1986) identified this phenomenon through a careful comparative survey of 55 American and 51 Japanese manufacturing plants. They investigated hierarchical levels to which real decision-making authority for 37 decision items is assigned, and found that the average level of decision-making authority was substantially lower in Japanese plants than in American plants. Similarly, Kagono et al. (1985) found, through their large-scale questionnaire survey of U.S. and Japanese firms, that strategic corporate decisions are made at or near the top in U.S. firms, whereas the decision making process involves employees at lower hierarchical levels in Japanese firms. See also, e.g., Clark (1979) and Cole (1979) .
Second and third differences, multiskilling and firm-specificity of human capital accumulation, concern the nature of human capital accumulation within firms. Koike (1977) observed, in his comparative study of Japanese and U.S. manufacturing plants, that workers in Japanese plants acquire much wider range of different skills through on-the-job training and rotation than workers in U.S. plants do (see also Koike, 1988) . Such multiskilling is not limited to factory workers but is also prevalent among so called white-collar employees in Japanese firms (see, e.g., Kono, 1984; Dertouzos et al., 1989) . According to Ito (1992) , "In order to have workers who possess many different skills, a Japanese company has them invest in various skills early in their careers at the company's expense. These human-capital investments pay off later in the worker's careers" (p. 215).
Concerning firm-specificity of human capital accumulation, Koike (1977) observed that Japanese firms provide their employees with more firm-specific skills by rotating them among related jobs (see also Dertouzos et al., 1989; Ito, 1992) . Aoki and Okuno-Fujiwara (1996) pointed out that, in Japanese factories, operators handle machine troubles and unusual operations through their firm-specific skills, whereas in U.S. factories it is usually engineers who handle them through general skills. Also, a recent survey of large Japanese firms, conducted by Daiichi Insurance Company in 1996, showed that only 34 per cent of employees felt they had transferable skills.
Fourth, Japanese firms conduct continuous process improvement more than U.S. firms do. According to Koike (1988) , workers in Japanese firms are encouraged to improve their work methods through actively participating in quality control (QC) circle activities, whereas workers in U.S. firms are expected to perform just routine work without making such improvement. The M.I.T. commission on Industrial Productivity found, through a number of case studies conducted in the late 1980s, that continuous process improvement is a key factor behind Japanese firms' productive edge. For example, the Commission found that, in Japanese steel manufacturing companies, engineers were located at each plant to continuously improve manufacturing processes through quickly addressing day-to-day operational problems; whereas, in the U.S.
counterparts, engineers were deployed at a central location and conducted trouble shooting only when they were called for (Dertouzos et al., 1989, p. 75-6) .
Finally, the labor turnover rate is higher in the United States than in Japan (see, e.g., Hashimoto and Raisian, 1985; Mincer and Higuchi, 1988; Blinder and Krueger, 1996) . Hashimoto and Raisian (1985) analyzed data from the Basic Survey of Employment for Japan and data from the Special Labor Force Report for the United States, and found that the fifteen-year job retention rates of the male population between the early 1960s and the late 1970s were much higher in Japan than in the United States across all age groups. They also found that average job tenure of employed males as of 1979 was longer in Japan than in the United States not only for large firms but also for small firms. 
THE MODEL
Consider a two-period economy. Only one good is produced in the economy, and its price is normalized to one. There is free entry and firms are risk neutral, and therefore in equilibrium all firms earn zero profits. To keep the analysis simple, firms and individuals do not discount the future. Labor is the only input, and the production requires two jobs (call them job A and job B).
An employee can be assigned to only one of these two jobs in each period. There is a continuum of individuals, indexed by j ∈ [0, N] (N > 0). In each period, labor supply is perfectly inelastic and fixed at one unit for each individual. Individuals display no disutility of effort. Also, assume that individuals are either risk neutral or averse.
Output is realized at the end of each period. Firm i's output in period t is given by
, where A it (B it ) denotes the set of j such that j ∈ A it (B it ) means individual j is employed by firm i and assigned to job A (B) in period t, µ denotes Lebesgue Measure, and
A it ρ ρ denotes individual j's productivity when she is employed by firm i and assigned to job A (B) in period t. The specification of
A it ρ ρ will be given below.
At the beginning of period 1, each individual has the same general human capital and looks identical to the firms. Firms simultaneously make first period wage offers ( 
otherwise, where superscript i and subscript u mean that individual j was hired by firm i in the first period and is in firm u in the second period.
i uj y is given by
where a uj is individual j's match quality with firm u. Here, x(t i , t u , z) (z = 0 or 1) captures the productivity of an individual who acquired skills in firm i and is in firm u in period 2, where z = 0 means that she has stayed with the same employer, and z = 1 means that she has changed her employer. Namely, i = u if z = 0 and i ≠ u if z = 1.
That is, if an employee has multiple skills, her productivity is higher under horizontal information structure than vertical information structure, whereas her productivity is higher under vertical information structure if she has just a single skill. This assumption reflects the point made by Aoki (1986) , who argued that horizontal information structure tends to be more efficient than vertical information structure if workers have broad knowledge on the whole work process of the firm through multiskilling, because such broad knowledge enables workers to make better decisions concerning how to cope with irregular and emergent events. Also assume that each firm i can choose t i = I (improved technology) only if it chooses k i = M (multiple skills). This assumption reflects Koike (1988) 's observation that the provision of multiple skills is indispensable for inducing workers to improve their work methods through quality control (QC) circles activities, because such improvement requires that workers have a good understanding of the entire production process. 8 If a firm conducts continuous process improvement, the technology is improved but a degree of specificity is introduced. This is because, in general, continuous process improvement involves a number of small changes and modifications, which lead to highly firm-specific technologies. Doeringer and Piore (1971) made exactly this point. 'Line supervision, and sometimes operatives and maintenance crews as well, are forever modifying equipment in order to improve its efficiency. Such changes accumulate quickly and can produce considerable movement toward specificity' (p. 17).
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Technology and skill acquisition are closely related. I assume that, if an individual acquires a skill under the general technology, her skill is equally valuable at any firm that employs the general technology; while, if an individual acquires a skill under an improved technology, her skill is specific to this firm to a certain degree. I assume that, holding everything else constant, an improved technology yields higher second period productivity than the general technology only if it is operated by an individual who is familiar with its firm-specificity.
Otherwise, it yields less productivity than the general technology.
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The two assumptions above imply the following properties for x(⋅, ⋅, ⋅). First, x(I, I, 0) takes the highest value among all combinations of x(t i , t u , z). Namely, holding everything else constant, an individual's second period productivity is the highest if she acquired skills under a firm's improved technology and operates it in period 2. Second, x(t i , t u , 1) ≤ x(G, G, 0) for all combinations of t i and t u , where the weak inequality holds with equality if and only if t i = t u = G. This says two things. First, suppose that an individual operates the general technology in period 2. If an individual acquired a skill under the general technology in period 1, her productivity is unaffected whether or not she changed her employers. On the other hand, if she acquired a skill under an improved technology, holding everything else constant, her period 2 productivity becomes lower due to firm-specificity of her skill. Second, if a firm's improved technology is 9 Also, Hayes and Wheelwright (1984) pointed out, 'Most world class Germany and Japanese manufacturing companies have large, well-staffed, very active machine shops. Much of the success of these companies is a result of the proprietary production processes that are incubated in these shops and therefore unavailable to their competitors' (p. 381).
operated by an individual who has not acquired skills under the technology and hence is not familiar with its firm-specificity, holding everything else constant, the improved technology yields less productivity than the general technology.
Individual j has match qualities a j ≡ (a 1j , a 2j , … , a γj ) with firm 1, 2, ..., γ respectively, where γ denotes the number of firms that offer second period wages and 0 ≤ a ij ≤ 1. The match qualities are independently and identically distributed across firms and individuals according to a uniform distribution between 0 and 1. This is common knowledge. At the beginning of period 1, a j is unknown to individual j and the firms. If an individual is employed by firm i in period 1, the match quality a ij becomes known to the individual and firm i at the end of period 1.
11 Match quality in my model is an experience good as in Jovanovic (1979) .
At the beginning of period 2, firms simultaneously make second period wage offers. All firms that operated in period 1 make wage offers to all individuals. Firms that did not operate in period 1 can also make wage offers. Firm i's wage offer to another firm's period 1 employees is denoted w iu (i ≠ u) . Note that, when a firm makes wage offers to its own period 1 employees, it knows their match qualities with itself. Hence, the wage offers can be different across individuals. w j ii denotes firm i's wage offer to its own period 1 employee, individual j. I assume that wage offers are public knowledge. Given the wage offers, each individual takes the highest one. If more than one firm offers the highest wage, the employee stays with her current employer if it offered the highest wage, and randomly chooses one of the highest offers otherwise.
11 One way to justify the learning of match qualities is by assuming that the match qualities affect first period productivities, and each employer learns her first period employees' match qualities by observing their productivities. All the results of the paper follow under this assumption if each individual's expected first period productivity is d. Whether or not other firms learn the match quality a ij does not affect the results, because an individual's match qualities are independently distributed across firms. If the match qualities were correlated across firms and the realization of match quality were known only to the individual and her current employer, adverse selection would occur as in Greenwald (1986) . Since the focus of this paper is on interconnections among the three key features of work organizations and its labor market consequences, I do not incorporate adverse selection into my model. Firms that did not operate in period 1 can also make second period wage offers.
(Stage 4) Given the second period wage offers, each individual takes the highest one. If more than one firm offers the highest wage, the employee stays with her current employer if it offered the highest wage, and randomly chooses one of the highest offers otherwise.
ANALYSIS
In this section, I consider Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE) in pure strategies of the model described above. I define MHI-equilibrium to be an SPNE outcome where each firm provides its employees with multiple skills (M), chooses horizontal information structure (H), and all other firms chose (k u , r u , t u ) = (K, R, T) at stage 2. The SPNE outcome of the subsequent subgame is characterized by the following.
where the weak inequality holds with equality for at least two firms.
for all j employed by firm i in period 1, where 0 ≤ η < w*.
Suppose individual j was employed by firm i in period 1. Since her match quality with other firms is unknown, her period 2 expected productivity in firm u (≠ i) (provided that she is assigned to a job for which she has acquired a skill) is E(a uj )x(t i , t u , 1)r u (k Also, the MHI-equilibrium exhibits a lower turnover rate than the SVG-equilibrium. There exist parameterizations for which c' < c''.
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12 This property holds whether k i is S or M, because, if k i = S, a half of firm i's period 1 employees acquire a skill for job A and the other half acquire a skill for job B.
13 There do not exist asymmetric equilibria in which at least two firms choose the same combination of skill provision (S or M), information structure (V or H), and technology (G or I). However, I was unable to rule out the possibility of asymmetric equilibria in which one firm chooses a different combination from all other firms.
It is well known that strategic complementarity can cause multiple equilibria. 14 Cooper and John (1988) showed that strategic complementarity is necessary for multiple symmetric Nash equilibria. The logic is as follows. 15 Consider a game where n agents choose actions, either the low action (L) or the high action (H), simultaneously and non-cooperatively to maximize their payoffs. Suppose there exist two symmetric equilibria, the low action equilibrium and the high action equilibrium. Then an agent's optimal strategy is L when all other agents choose L.
Namely the agent's incremental payoff from choosing H over L is negative when all other agents choose L. On the other hand, if all other agents choose H, the agent will increase her payoff by choosing H over L. Namely the incremental payoff is positive in this case. This is a strategic complementarity; an agent's marginal (incremental) return increases when all other agents increase their actions (choose H over L).
In my model, strategic complementarity arises endogenously due to labor market equilibrium all firms earn zero profit due to free entry, this implies that total wages are higher in the MHI-equilibrium than in the SVG-equilibrium, and so the former Pareto dominates the latter.
By interpreting the MHI-equilibrium to be Japanese equilibrium and the SVGequilibrium to be U.S. equilibrium, the model provides an explanation for the five U.S.-Japanese differences in work organizations and labor market practices. In the Japanese equilibrium, all firms provide their employees with multiple skills, and take advantage of the multiple skills by conducting continuous process improvement and employing horizontal information structure. A degree of specificity is introduced into each firm's improved technology, which results in firm-specificity in human capital and thus lowers the turnover rate. Due to the low turnover rate, each firm's extra investment in multiskilling pays off later. In contrast, in the U.S. equilibrium all firms provide their employees with a single skill. This induces each firm to employ vertical information structure and adopt the general technology, which results in general human capital and higher turnover rate. The extra investment in multiple skills does not pay off due to the high turnover rate.
This explanation can be viewed as a formalization of the conjecture by Aoki (1986) , who suggested that the different nature of labor mobility between the United States and Japan, interfirm mobility and intrafirm mobility (i.e. rotation) respectively, could be closely related to the difference in information structure of the firms between the two countries. He wrote, "I simply suggest that there may be a close connection between labor market characteristics and information systematic characteristics of the firm from a comparative perspective" (Aoki, 1986, p. 981 ). In my model, the difference in labor turnover rate endogenously arises due to labor market externality and provides a systematic explanation for U.S.-Japanese differences in several key features of work organizations.
Concerning equilibrium selection, historical events during the Second World War can provide an explanation for why different equilibria have been selected in the United States and Japan. Moriguchi (2000) points out that government labor regulations for enhancing labor productivity during the war were substantially different between the United States and Japan in many aspects. The U.S. government promoted job simplification and standardization, and created industry-wide training programs such as the Training Within Industry program. In contrast, the Japanese government encouraged corporate training programs and the development of workers with multiple and firm-specific skills. The Skilled Employee Training Ordinance of foster "skilled mainstay workers (chuken jukuren-ko), which were defined as those who were multi-skilled and possessed a considerable technical ability to judge and perform tasks on the shop floor without consulting an instructor.
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In my framework, one can interpret that this difference in governmental policies during the war led the United States to choose the SVG-equilibrium while Japan to choose the MHIequilibrium in the postwar period. This interpretation is consistent with the fact that the average turnover rate of manufacturing workers in the U.S. was comparable to that in Japan before the Second World War, in contrast to the postwar period during which the two numbers exhibited a significant difference (Moriguchi, 2000) .
In 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This paper has focused on the five U.S.-Japanese differences in work organizations and labor market practices; namely, real decision-making authority is delegated more to lower hierarchical levels in Japanese firms, Japanese firms tend to provide their employees with multiple skills, human capital accumulation is more firm-specific in Japanese firms, Japanese labor turnover rate is lower, and Japanese firms conduct continuous process improvement more than U.S. firms do.
I have presented a model that provides an explanation for these differences based on the multiplicity of equilibria, where strategic complementarity concerning choice of work organizations arises endogenously due to labor market externality. In the Japanese equilibrium, each firm provides its employees with multiple skills. This enables continuous process improvement, because employees obtain a good understanding of the firm's entire work process through acquiring multiple skills. Also, each firm employs horizontal information structure, in which multiple-skilled employees have substantial decision-making authority and determine how to cope with irregular and emergent events. Since continuous process improvement leads to a degree of specificity in a firm's technology, skills acquired by its employees become less effective in other firms. This lowers the turnover rate in the Japanese equilibrium, which, in turn,
implies that Japanese firms' extra human capital investments for providing multiple skills pay off later. In contrast, no firms provide their employees with multiple skills in the U.S. equilibrium.
This induces each firm to employ vertical information structure and adopt the general technology. Employees accumulate general human capital under the general technology, and this raises the turnover rate in the U.S. equilibrium.
This paper is related to Morita (2001) , which showed that connection between continuous process improvement and the firm-specificity of training causes multiplicity of equilibria, and explored its labor market consequences. Carmichael and MacLeod (1993) presented a model in which multiskilling serves as employers' commitment device for inducing their employees to actively participate in technological progress. Under principal-multi agents frameworks, Itoh (1991, 1992, 1994) and Owan (2001) analyzed agents' incentive issues, which have not been addressed in the present paper. Concerning explanations for cross country differences based on multiple equilibria, several authors recently proposed models that provide explanations for the lower turnover rate and higher human capital accumulation in Japan (or Germany) than in the United States (see, for example, Prendergast, 1989; Chang and Wang, 1995; Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998) , where informational asymmetry on workers' abilities causes multiple equilibria.
This paper makes a contribution complementary to them. The main contribution of the present paper is that it addresses interconnections among three key features of work organizations (multiskilling, delegation, and continuous process improvement), and analyses ways in which they are related to labor market practices. It analyses strategic interactions among firms concerning their choices of the nature of work organizations, and shows that strategic complementarity due to labor market externality can yield the multiplicity of equilibria, which provides a systematic explanation for the U.S.-Japanese differences in work organizations and labor market practices. Furthermore, concerning equilibrium selection, historical events during the Second World War can provide an explanation for why different equilibria have been selected in the United States and Japan in the post war period.
Although this paper focused on an explanation for U.S.-Japanese differences based on multiplicity of equilibria, my model can be extended so that it yields explanations based on exogenous factors such as differences in the effectiveness of research and development (R&D). Mansfield (1988) found, in his comparative study of industrial R&D in Japan and the United
States, that the rate of return from industrial basic research was higher in the United States than in Japan. This difference implies that U.S. firms tend to invest in basic research more than Japanese firms do, where basic research aims at inventing entirely new products and processes.
This in turn implies that the return of continuous process improvement in U.S. firms tends to be lower than in Japanese firms, because such an improvement is built upon currently available technology and production processes which could become obsolete if entirely new technology and production processes are invented. My theoretical framework would then suggest that, if the extra cost for providing multiple skills is in an intermediate range, multiskilling is beneficial only for Japanese firms, and this would result in the set of U.S.-Japanese differences that this paper focused on. In a future research, I plan to extend the model in such directions. Note that all individuals are employed in any Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE).
To see this, suppose some individuals are not employed. Then, a firm has an incentive to offer a wage w (∈(0, d)), employ them, and earn a strictly positive profit. Therefore, D < N/2 ensures that at least three firms operate in any equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 1:
I will first establish two more lemmas. (K, R, T)], is as follows.
) and 0 otherwise,
and R(k i ) is defined analogously.
Proof of Lemma 2:
First I will show that firm i's period 2 profit from retained employees is (n/2)φ(k i , r i , t i , R, T). By Lemma 1, firm i retains individual j if a ij ≥ x(t i , T, 1)R(k i )/(2x(t i , t i , 0)r i (k i )) ≡ ã by offering w j ii = w*. Then, firm i's period 2 profit from retained employees is 0 if ã > 1. Otherwise, applying the law of large numbers, the profit is given by
Next I will show that firm i's period 2 profit from employees trained by other firms, Claim 1: (i) Given all other firms choose (k u , r u , t u ) = (M, H, I), firm i's optimal choice cannot be
Proof of Claim 1: (
> 0. This implies the result.
Q.E.D.
Suppose that an MHI-equilibrium exists where m (∈ [ m m, ]) firms operate in period 1.
In the equilibrium, all m firms offer the same period 1 wage at stage 1 and choose (M, H, I). 
Next, I will show that (A5) is also sufficient. Suppose (A5) holds. Pick any c that satisfies (A5) and define m to be the maximum integer such that "c' < c < " c ( m +1) and m < M" holds.
Define w M and w S as follows.
and
Let n* be the maximum real number such that both (A6) and ( 
